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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880362 
v. i 
DEAN KEITH HICKMAN, t Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of a first degree 
felony in the Third District Court. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(h)(1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant should have been allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the trial court 
failed to establish a factual basis for aggravated robbery where 
the court explained the facts to defendant at the time he entered 
his plea. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1953): 
Attempt-Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime, if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, 
he engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the 
offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct 
does not constitute a substantial step unless 
it is strongly corroborative of the actor's 
intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt 
shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was 
actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal 
impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances 
been as the actor believed them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (1953): 
Robbery. 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1953): 
Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery 
if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the 
first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be deemed to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, 
or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission of a robbery. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with attempted first degree 
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 
76-5-202 (1978); aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-203 (1978); and aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 
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76-6-302 (1978) (R. 14-15). On January 18, 1985, defendant 
appeared before Judge Scott Daniels in the Third District Court 
and pled guilty to aggravated robbery pursuant to a plea bargain 
agreement that, inter alia, dismissed the other two counts (R. 
238). 
Defendant, who waived his right to be sentenced at a 
later date and did not wish to have a presentence report, 
requested immediate sentencing (R. 238 at 9). Judge Daniels 
sentenced defendant to a term of five years to life in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 238 at 9-10). 
Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on July 6, 
1988 (R. 186-223). Judge Daniels denied the motion on August 11, 
1988 (R. 114-15). Defendant appeals from the denial of that 
motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts are contained in the Statement of 
the Case above and in the Argument portion of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's guilty plea was voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent because Judge Daniels described to defendant the 
factual bases of the plea required to establish the elements of 
aggravated robbery. Defendant's belated claim that no property 
was taken does not invalidate his plea where he expressly 
admitted to taking property on the record. The record as a whole 
All record references are to the transcripts and pleadings 
contained in companion case number 880305. 
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also establishes that defendant was not threatened or promised 
anything to induce his plea. For these reasons, Judge Daniels 
did not abuse his discretion in refusing to allow defendant to 
withdraw his plea. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY AND 
INTELLIGENTLY PLED GUILTY AND THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
PLEA. 
Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea claiming 
that it was unknowing, involuntary and unintelligent and taken in 
violation of Rule 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Rule 
3.6 of the Rules of Practice in District Courts. Specifically, 
defendant asserted that Judge Daniels did not establish a factual 
basis for his plea to aggravated robbery. A review of the 
transcript of the arraignment reveals that defendant's claim is 
meritless. 
Initially, it should be noted that this Court will not 
overturn an order denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
unless it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Mildenhall, 
747 P.2d 422 (Utah 1987). This is especially true where the plea 
is the result of plea bargaining. State v» Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 
(Utah 1977). Judge Daniels did not abuse his discretion in 
denying defendant's motion because he did advise defendant of the 
fact8 in relation to the elements of aggravated robbery. 
During the arraignment the following occurred; 
THE COURT: Let me — I want you to 
understand what the elements of the offense 
are, make sure you know what they'd have to 
prove. 
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They would have to prove that in Salt 
Lake County at about 965 South 2200 East, on 
or about November 1st, 1984, you unlawfully 
and intentionally took personal property in 
possession of A. W. Kelson or from his 
immediate person by threatening with some 
sort of a deadly weapon. They'd have to 
prove it was in Salt Lake County. They'd 
have to prove the date, prove you did it to 
A. W. Kelson. All those things they have to 
prove, all the elements that are read. Do 
you understand that? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Is the 
reason that you are pleading guilty of this 
charge because you are guilty of it? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
(R. 238 at 6-7). This passage clearly contained a sufficient 
factual basis for a conviction of aggravated robbery which is 
defined in Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-301 and -302 (1978) as "the 
unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in the 
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear" by use 
of a "deadly weapon." 
Defendant more specifically alleges that he could not 
have been found guilty of aggravated robbery because no property 
was actually taken and that he should not have been allowed to 
plead guilty (App. Brief at 12). Because defendant pled guilty 
after Judge Daniels explained to him that an element of the 
offense was the taking of property, said that he understood the 
elements and said he was pleading guilty because he was guilty, 
(see R. 238 at 7), he should not now be heard to complain that 
the facts as described by the trial court are not the actual 
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facts of the case. United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718-19 
(2nd Cir. 1965), cert, denied 382 U.S. 843 (1965)(guilty plea 
waives all nonjurisdictional claims); c.f > State v* Beck, 584 
P.2d 870 (Utah 1978)(guilty plea waives right to appeal lack of 
jury trial) and State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977)(guilty 
plea waives claim of lack of probable cause for arrest warrant). 
Even if this Court does review the merits of 
defendant's claim that the facts do not support his conviction/ 
defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea. Section 76-6-
302(3) provides that a person is guilty of aggravated robbery if 
in the course of an attempt to commit robbery he uses a deadly 
weapon. Thus, the completed offense of aggravated robbery does 
not require that property actually be taken only that the actor 
intentionally engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of a robbery using a deadly weapon. See Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-4-101 (1978)(attempt defined)(quoted above at 1). 
Defendant also claims that Judge Daniels erred in 
failing to determine that his plea was not the result of threats 
or other inducements (App. Brief at 5). Judge Daniels did not 
expressly rule on this issue, however, defendant's motion to 
withdraw does contain a reference to the Rule 11 requirement that 
the judge determine that his plea was not the result of threats 
or promises (R. 191). Thus, Judge Daniels implicitly ruled that 
the issue did not support withdrawal of the plea. 
While it is true that Judge Daniels did not 
specifically ask defendant at the time of his plea if he had been 
threatened or otherwise induced to plead guilty, the 
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circumstances as a whole support Judge Daniels' finding that the 
plea was voluntary. See Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 
1985), and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985). Judge 
Daniels received a full explanation of the plea agreement in open 
court (R. 238 at 2-3). He also established that defendant pled 
guilty because he was guilty (R. 238 at 7); leading to a logical 
inference that defendant was not pleading guilty due to threats 
or inducements. Finally, defendant executed an affidavit in open 
court that specifically states that "[n]o promises or threats of 
any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty." (R. 21). 
Defendant cites State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987) for the proposition that the trial judge was required to 
question defendant on the record about promises or threats. 
Gibbons was decided three years after defendant pled guilty. 
Prior to Gibbons, this Court had always applied the Brooks-Warner 
record as a whole test. This Court should adopt the position 
taken by the Court of Appeals in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 
92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rehearing denied, 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 
(1988), cert, denied 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988); that Gibbons 
represents a clear break with the past in application of a 
procedural rule and that it will not be retroactively applied. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the decision of the lower court and deny defendant's 
request to withdraw his guilty plea. 
DATED this 3t?d day of March, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
/^o/iWDRA L 7
 ^ A s s i s tan rney General 
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